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Introduction

Background and Contention of Article

The "Orphan Works Act of 2006" was introduced in Congress in
September 2006 as part of broader copyright reform legislation under
the heading "The Copyright Modernization Act of 2006."1 Although
the 109th Congress did not pass the legislation, it is expected to be
picked up in 2007, and its likelihood of passage is considered good.2
The Orphan Works Act is based directly on a January 31, 2006,
"Report on Orphan Works"3 by the Copyright Office. The Report
uses the term "orphan works" to describe a situation where the owner
of a copyrighted work cannot be identified and located by someone
who wishes to make use of the work in a manner that requires the
permission of the copyright owner. The Report makes a specific
proposal for a new Section 514 to be added to the Copyright Act,
which has now been introduced as the Orphan Works Act. The main
operative provision of the act is limiting the liability of the user of an
orphan work (as defined in the Act) to "reasonable compensation."
The Act also generally precludes injunctions against copyright users
of orphan works, thereby softening the typical property rule running
through the Copyright Act to a liability rule.
The goal of this article is to analyze the Orphan Works Act from
an economic viewpoint. To accomplish this, the article proposes an
economic model that can be used as a conceptual backdrop by
policymakers for analyzing the output implications of changes to
copyright law. The model is based on the dominant view that the
maximization of societal welfare through output-i.e., creation and
dissemination of works of authorship-is the constitutionally
mandated objective of the copyright regime. Acceptance of this neoutilitarian policy objective implies that, just as antitrust protects
"competition, not competitors," 5 the copyright regime should protect
1. H.R. 6052, 109th Cong. (2006).
2. Panel discussion "Copyright 'Modernization': What Is the Agenda on Capitol
Hill?" organized by the Progress & Freedom Foundation in Washington, D.C. on October
20, 2006; speakers David Jones, Counsel, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee of Intellectual
Property; Joe Keeley, Counsel, House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property; and Amy Levine, Legislative Counsel, Rep. Rick Boucher (D-Va).
3. U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Orphan Works: a Report of the Register of
Copyrights, January 2006, available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-reportfull.pdf [hereinafter REPORT on ORPHAN WORKS].
4. Id. at 1.
5. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
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creativity, not creators. Protecting creativity often is consistent with
protecting creators, but it recognizes the need to distribute the
incentives for creation beyond the physical authors of the works to
constituencies that make creativity possible. Fundamentally, under
this positive law philosophy the proper scope of copyright becomes a
balancing test where Congress should expand or limit the property
grant claimable under the Copyright Act 6 based on the output effects
of the change.
The conclusion of the article is that the Orphan Works Act is
consistent with the objectives of the copyright system and that it
should be approved into law.
B.

Structure of Article

This article starts in Part II with a discussion of the theoretical
foundations of copyright and an analysis of the Constitutional
mandate for the United States copyright regime. The article adopts
the majority view that the drafters of the Constitution expressly
intended copyright to serve a society by creating incentives for the
creative community to maximize the output of copyrighted works.
The subsequent economic modeling is based on the notion that the
objective of the copyright regime is to maximize societal welfare by
optimizing copyright to induce the supply side to creative expression.
Part III starts with a summary of the incentive-access paradigm
and introduces some of the economic models of intellectual property
in the economics literature. A more detailed review of the model by
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner in their recent
book The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law7 is
presented. After observing some key notions contained in the
Landes/Posner model, the article then discusses some of the
infirmities of their presentation.
Part IV then presents an alternative output-maximizing
economic model for copyright-an exposition of the incentive-access
paradigm. The model presented is specifically designed to identify the
social welfare maximizing value of z, a factor that Landes and Posner
assign to the level of statutory propertization of intellectual rights.
Part V applies the new model to the Orphan Works Act. The
article concludes in Part VI that the Orphan Works Act would

6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-122. (1976) (property grant contained specifically in 17 U.S.C. §
106, subject to limitations contained in §§ 107 - 122).
7. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003) [hereinafter Landes/Posner].
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increase the output of copyrighted works thereby increasing societal
welfare, and as such the Act should be implemented.

H. The Objective of Copyright
In order to build an economic model for a copyright regime it is
necessary to have a quantifiable measure for the objective of the

desired societal outcome. 8 Since policy decisions by Congress on the
scope of copyright protection are bound by the Constitution, we
begin the discussion by analyzing the Constitutional mandate for the

copyright system.
A.

Foundations of Copyright

The two 9 prevalent legal theories on the foundation of copyright
are the natural law and positive law schools.' ° The fundamental
policy distinction between the two philosophies is that under the

former, the primary policy focus is the protection of the authors'
rights whereas in the latter the focus is society's broader interests."
The natural law foundation for copyright is based on the 17th

century work of the legal philosopher John Locke, specifically his
labor theory of property acquisition. According to Locke, a man's
"labor being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but
he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there

8. L. Ray Patterson, Nimmer's Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: A Comment, 38
Hous. L. REV. 431, 434 (2001) ("Lawmakers, legislative or judicial, simply cannot allocate
rights between [the different interest] groups in a reasonable way without common
premises to provide the basis for the allocation").
9. Some commentators also acknowledge a separate "just reward" theory of
copyright. Mark S.Nadel, How Current Copyright Law DiscouragesCreative Output: The
Overlooked Impact of Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 786, 794 (2004). The "just
reward" theory, however, does not purport to explain why copyright exists. It is more
properly seen as a theoretical approach to copyright within the positive law school.
10.

The positive law/natural law divide has been extensively examined by professors

L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce, both separately and together. See, e.g., Craig Joyce, "A
Curious Chapter in the History of Judicature":Wheaton v. Peters and the Rest of the Story
(of Copyright in the New Republic), 42 Hous. L. REV. 325, 360 (2005); L. Ray Patterson
and Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders' View of the
Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 924 (2003); L. Ray Patterson, What's Wrong with

Eldred? An Essay on Copyright Jurisprudence, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 345, 345 (2003).
Some commentators consider moral rights as a separate foundation, but the majority view
is that moral rights are a key attribute of the natural law philosophy. See, e.g., Patty
Gerstenblith, Architect as Artist: Artists' Rights and Historic Preservation, 12 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 431, 439 (1994) ("The copyright/moral rights distinction is founded on
an underlying difference between positive law and natural law").
11. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 8, at 434.
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is enough, and as good, left in common for others." 2 Under a natural
rights approach there exists an "inherent"-i.e., natural, 3-right to
the work by the author that is not subject to polity limitation based on
the broader interests of society. 14 The commonly recognized
inalienable 5 rights under a natural law theory are the key moral
rights of attribution, integrity, and disclosure, as well as the right to
withdraw the work from the public and to receive protection from
excessive criticism.16
The natural law philosophy was challenged when England
abolished the prior Stationers' Company monopoly and enacted the

Statute of Anne in 1710.17 The Statute of Anne represented a societal
determination that copyright should be viewed as a statutory trade

regulatory tool that has the objective of maximizing societal welfare. 8
Through its premise that copyright exists for "the encouragement of
learning," ' 9 the Statute of Anne is widely seen as being the first
copyright regime to view copyright from a broader societal vantage
point. In England the House of Lords' 1774 decision in Donaldson v.

Beckett2 ° is considered the final straw in affirming that copyright

exists only through polity grace as a statutory property grant subject
12. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Book II, Ch. V (c. 1690) as
reprinted in JESSE DUKEMINIER AND JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (5th Ed) at 16 (Aspen

Law & Business 2002).
13. In fact, Locke derives the grant of the right from God, so the term "natural right"
is misleading in that the claimed right according to the Lockean school originates from a
supernatural source.
14. Peter Read Teachout, The Soul of the Fugue: An Essay on Reading Fuller, 70
MINN. L. REV. 1073, 1117 (1986) ("[T]he natural law approach.. .takes the view that law is
the reflection of eternal principles which exist above and apart from whatever the state or
the sovereign may choose to do").
15. See, e.g., Monica E. Antezana, The European Union Internet Copyright Directive
as Even More than it Envisions: Toward a Supra-EU Harmonization of Copyright Policy
and Theory, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 415, 421 (2003) (explaining how moral rights
under a Continental natural right regime are inalienable as an "extension of the author's
personality"). It is unclear, however, why limiting the alienability of rights is necessarily in
the interest of the author.
16. Gerstenblith, supra note 10 at 439.
17. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 21 §1 (Eng.).
18. Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the
Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV 365, 409 (2004) ("The
important point is this: the Statute of Anne, the ancestor of American copyright law, had
as its foremost objective the encouragement of learning-a general public interest-not
the private economic interests of authors, printers, or publishers").
19. The formal name of the Statute of Anne was "An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning, by vesting the copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such
copies during the Times therein mentioned." Paul Goldstein, Int'l Copyright: Principles,
Law, and Practice 3 (2001), cited in 15 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 827, 835 (2006).
20. 1 Eng Rep. 837, 842 (H.L. 1774).
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determined by the grantor: the government,
to the scope restrictions
2
'
based on social policy.

The 18th century English developments in the Statute of Anne
and Donaldson v. Beckett inspired the positive law school of
copyright, which enshrines copyright as a utilitarian societal tool to
preserve incentives for creators of works of authorship to ensure a
sufficient flow of copyrightable works for the benefit of society. An
important addition, however, is the need to also ensure proper
alienability for copyrighted works so that a market of creative
expression can evolve. The statute thus recognizes that inducement of
creation needs to be paired with dissemination of works to
consumers. A strict interpretation of the positive law philosophy
would allow the polity freely to assign the property grant given to
authors without regard to a moral argument that the author should
have rights simply as a result of being the creator.
Although modern copyright systems have attributes of both
premises, the positive law versus natural law schism persists in
copyright today, as it does in other areas of law.22 As a general notion
the old English colonies, as a result of the direct influence of the
Statute of Anne, tend to be more positive law biased whereas the
Continental European systems continue to heed their natural law
origins. 23 It will remain to be seen how in the increasingly globalized
world of the Internet the two copyright systems that result in different
policy outcomes can coexist.24
21. See, e.g., Joyce, supra note 10, at 331 (the case determined copyright "to be a
creature of statutory grant alone"); see also, Joseph J. Beard, Everything Old Is New
Again, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 19, 38 (2004) ("If there had been a common law copyright in
published works before the Statute of Anne, Donaldson v. Beckett declared it was no
more").
22. Teachout, supra note 14, at 1117 (analyzing Lon Fuller's jurisprudential writings
noting how "the schism between the philosophers of natural law and the legal positivists
has been deep and largely unbridged for decades").
23. See, e.g., P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe,
in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 241 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Wenstock
Natanel eds. Kluwer Law 2002); see also, Michael B. Reddy, The Droit De Suite: Why
American Fine Artists Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J.

509, 537 (1995) ("Modem parallels to this dichotomy can be seen in the philosophical
differences between the French tradition of moral rights and the American history of
positive copyright law").
24. The modern natural law proponents in Europe defend the theory on a political
argument that authors' rights need to be expanded to prevent the weak initial bargaining
power of the individual authors to be exploited by large companies acquiring copyrights.
Commenting on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the European social model is
beyond the scope of this article. As to the coexistence, it would seem necessary that just as
common law and civil law are melding, especially in European Union law, the same would
need to happen with the different traditions of copyright law.
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The following discussion explains this article's premise of
treating the Constitution as mandating a fundamentally positive law

regime where Congress' goal is to maximize output of copyrightable
works rather than protect the interests of any specific interest group.
This is not intended to deny that there are noticeable strains of
natural law elements in the Copyright Act. 25 However, and while
recognizing the existence of opposing views,26 the model presented in
27
this article subscribes to the majority view that the Copyright Clause

of the United States Constitution is fundamentally utilitarian as the
basis for the economic analysis. 28
25. E.g. 17 U.S.C. §106A (granting a "moral right" to visual artists); 17 U.S.C.
§203(a)(5) (limiting authors' rights to sell their copyrights).
26. E.g., Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the NaturalLaw of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993)
(arguing that "Locke's work influenced the framers of our Constitution and continues to
influence contemporary courts"); Orit Fischman Afori, Human Rights and Copyright: The
Introduction of Natural Law Considerations Into American Copyright, 14 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 497 (2004) (Interpreting the Constitutional Copyright
Clause as "not totally rejecting natural law conceptions").
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their
respective Writings and Discoveries")
28. See discussion in Sections B. and C., infra. See also, PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT § 1.14 (2d ed. 2002) (the "overarching object of copyright law in the United
States is to encourage the widest possible production and dissemination of literary and
artistic works."); JULIE E. COHEN, ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION

ECONOMY at 7 (Aspen Law & Business 2d ed 2006) ("[Clopyright's purpose is purely
utilitarian.. .the Framers of the U.S. Constitution embraced this utilitarian rationale for
copyright protection..."); Melvin A. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§1.03[A] 1-88 (2005) (explaining that "copyright is predicated on the dual premise that
the public benefits from the creative activities of authors, and that the copyright monopoly
is a necessary condition to the full realization of such creative activities"); Marci A.
Hamilton, Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudence of Deference, 47 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 317, 319 (2000) ("From the first case, through the present, the
[Supreme] Court has treated copyright law as positive law"); Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Private Strands in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104
MICH. L. REV. 291, 310 (2005) ("[Tihe dominant rationale for copyright in the United
States is utilitarian"); Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright
Law: Theory and Application, 13 J. INTELL PROP. L. 1, 7 (2005) ("[D]espite uniform
agreement that United States copyright law is utilitarian in nature with the bottom line
purpose to maximize social welfare, [the current Copyright Act does not do this]");
Deborah Tussey, Technology Matters: The Courts, Media Neutrality, and New
Technologies, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 427, 442 (2005) ("This balancing of interests echoes
the utilitarian approach to copyright, constitutionally based in the Copyright Clause"); Jim
Chen, A Sober Look at Appellations of Origin: How the United States Will Crash France's
Wine and Cheese Party,5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 29, 58 (1996) ("The United States has
long favored a positive law theory of intellectual property over a natural law theory"); Jill
R. Appelbaum, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: An Analysis Based on the French
Droit Moral, 8 AM. U. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 183, 197 (1992) ("The American system of
copyright rooted in positive rather than natural law, favors the economic over the personal
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Jurisprudence on the Constitutional Mandate for Copyright

At the time of writing the Constitution the Founders understood
both the natural law and positive law theories, and there is substantial
support that their choice of a positive law foundation was deliberate.29
Thomas Jefferson is known to have openly rejected a natural rights
theory for copyright in his correspondence.'
Although less openly
so, James Madison is also seen as having expressly rejected any
natural law rights of authors."
A utilitarian foundation for the copyright regime has been

confirmed by the Supreme Court on several occasions. In its 1954
decision in Mazer v. Stein, the Court explained the economic
philosophy behind the Copyright Clause by stating that "the

encouragement of individual effort for personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors."32 Presumably the Court also encompassed in its definition

of "authors" the broader creative community and various
constituencies that enable creativity by providing financing and
dissemination to works of authorship, such as film studios and book

publishers. The Court expressly recognized that the incentive to profit
is the engine that drives copyright output, but that these profits are a
means, and not an end, to the ultimate Constitutional objective of
welfare maximization.
The teaching of Mazer was reaffirmed multiple times in the

Supreme Court's 1984 Sony decision.

3

The Court stated that "[t]he

enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the

Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in
interest of authors."); Dallon, supra note 18, at 423 ("The Constitution adopted the
utilitarian, public benefit rationale for copyright protection over the property right
rationale.").
29. Patterson & Joyce, supra note 10, at 930. Professors Patterson and Joyce appear
to use common law copyright to describe a natural law based foundation. Common law
copyright, however, suggests that the issue is whether the law is codified (statutory law) or
judicial (common law). The focus, however, is whether copyright exists as a matter of
polity grant (positive law) and remains subject to polity limitation for the benefit of
societal welfare or whether copyright rights are "inherent" (natural law).
30. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966) ("[Jefferson]
rejected a natural-rights theory in intellectual property rights and clearly recognized the
social and economic rationale of the patent system. The patent monopoly was not
designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a
reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge").
31. Dallon, supra note 18, at 424 (stating that Madison's writings "clarify that he did
not believe in perpetual common law copyrights rooted in the natural law rights of
authors").
32. 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
33. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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his writings,... but upon the ground that the welfare of the public

will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be
promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive
rights to their writings."'
The Court concluded that "[t]he sole
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the
labors of authors., 3 Again, presumably the "labors of authors"
language is intended to encompass the investments made in creative
works by constituencies beyond the physical individual "laborer"
artist.
Since Sony the Supreme Court has emphasized further the profit
motive as a key component of the social equation.36 Ensuring that
investment by the industries that are responsible for the vast majority
of the economic output from copyrighted content-i.e., film studios,
record companies and book publishers-is maintained is an important
part of the social function. Therefore, appropriate focus on the profit
motive of producers of copyrighted works is not inconsistent with the
social welfare maximization objective.
C.

History and Expansion of the Breadth and Length of Copyright

Throughout the past two centuries the property grant of
copyright claimants has substantially expanded. The first copyright
legislation in the United States, the Copyright Act of 1790, was a
"scant two or three pages," compared to the present Act, which
"weighs in at more than two hundred densely packed pages., 37 This
increase in volume has not only added complexity to the law, 38 but
also substantially expanded its substantive reach.
The subject matter of copyright in the original Act of 1790
included only maps, charts, and books but then over time expanded
to a list of specific categories of works.39

Despite the current

34. Id. at n.10 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 7(1909)).
35. Id. at 432 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
36. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003).
37. Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright,83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 88-89 (2004).
38. Recent amendments of the Copyright Act are extremely long and complex, and
therefore arguably difficult to implement. See also David Nimmer, Ignoring the Public,
PartI: On the Absurd Complexity of the DigitalAudio Transmission Right, 7 UCLA ENT.
L. REV. 189 (2000) (discussing the opacity of recent statutes governing digital audio
transmissions); David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV.
1233, 1320 (2004) (discussing the increased length and frequency of amendments to the
1976 Copyright Act).
39. Liu, supra note 37, at 89 (by the 1909 Act, copyright protection extended also to
prints, musical compositions, photographs, paintings, drawings, chromolithographs,
statues, and works of fine art).
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Copyright Act's still containing a list of "[w]orks of authorship" * that
presumably contain the eligible subject matter of copyright
protection, courts have recognized categories such as characters,
computer programs, and databases as subject matter capable of
copyright protection. 4 This expansion has drawn a wide range of
criticism from scholars42 and has even been dubbed the "second
enclosure movement" by commentators.43
In addition to subject matter, the temporal property right given
to copyrights has expanded from the original term of fourteen years4
to the present term of 70 years from the author's death or 95 years

from creation for works for hire. 45 The breadth of protection has also
been expanded, starting with the inclusion of derivative work
protection originally included in the Act of 190946 to the various anticircumvention protections of the recent Digital Millennium Copyright
Act.47 Along the way copyright claimants' rights have been expanded
by courts as well as by Congress, in broad doctrinal strikes 48 and by
specific changes targeted at very limited situations. 9
40. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) lists works of authorship as: (1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings;
and (8) architectural works.
41. See, e.g., COHEN, ET. AL., supra note 28 at 238 (discussing the copyright
protection of computer software) and at 294 (discussing copyright protection of
databases).
42. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright in the New Information Age, 40 CATH. U. L.
REV. 829, 833 (1991) (suggesting that "time and experience may prove these extensions
[namely protection of computer software and databases] of copyright subject matter to be
a bad bargain"); Jessica Litman, Sharingand Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1,
18 n.65 (2004) ("There is a rich recent copyright literature analyzing the problems that
have accompanied recent expansions in copyright rights.").
43. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66-SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003).
44. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
45. The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L.No. 105-298, tit.
1, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (amending various sections of the Copyright Act of 1976, codified
as 17 U.S.C. § 101).
46. See, Liu, supra note 37, at 96. ("The exclusive rights [under the 1905 Act]
similarly expanded to include not only the rights to 'print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend'
the copyrighted work, but also the rights to create certain derivative works and publicly
perform certain works").
47. 17 U.S.C. §1201
48. The doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability are predominantly judgemade, though generally understood to have been codified by successive enactments by
Congress that built on those doctrines. See 18 Am. Jur. 2d Copyright and Literary
Property § 219 ("[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for
infringement committed by another, the absence of such express language in the copyright
statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain
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The scope of copyright has also expanded substantially through

the elimination of formalities that used to filter a part of otherwise
copyrightable works directly into the public domain.50 Finally, the
Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Feist5 enshrined the level of
originality required for copyright as "minimal,"52 which constitutes a
substantial expansion of copyright protection compared to the
standards applied a century ago."

Under the Constitutional mandate for Copyright discussed in the
prior section, the expansion of copyright is proper so long as the
increase in the property grant creates further net welfare surplus. It
would seem uncontroversial that going back to the narrow scope of
the 1790 Act would have substantial negative welfare consequences-

the general production of films, music, and other forms of
entertainment would surely decrease substantially, and those creative
efforts that required large initial investments would effectively cease.

While never perfect, the U.S. copyright system appears to have
functioned well during the past century. What we propose, however,

is that in evaluating further proposed changes to the Copyright Act or
de facto changes to copyright scope the output effects of the change
would be analyzed and considered as part of the discussion. We do

that in the following in the context of the Orphan Works Act and
conclude that it is consistent with the Constitutional objectives of
Copyright.

parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity, since vicarious liability
is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is
merely a species in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of
another").
49. See, e.g., the implementation of 17 U.S.C. §106A (providing specific additional
protection for only works of visual art).
50. See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform[aliz]ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV.
485, 496 (2004) (discussing various estimates for the percentage of works that were
"filtered out" due to the registration requirement before its abolishment).
51. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc., 499 U.S. 340
(1991).
52. Id. at 345 ("Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work
was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and
that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, the requisite level
of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works
make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, no matter how crude,
humble or obvious it might be") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
53. See COHEN, supra note 28, at 75-85. (discussing the differences of the originality
standard under Feist compared to the earlier standards of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) and Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239
(1903)).
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HI. Economic Models for Copyright
A. The Incentive/Access Paradigm as the Measure of Welfare
Maximization
Protecting copyrights leads to societal good because granting
authors exclusive rights will induce the creation of more creative
works. In the absence of any protection there would be little financial
incentive (or sometimes economic ability) for the creative community
to invest time and/or money in copyrighted works, and consequently
there would be a substantial decline in output, and the promotion of
creativity would not be served.' The creation of copyrightable
expression always requires an investment, which can be directly
financial (the production cost of a movie) or non-financial (the time
an author takes to write a novel). In either case, prior to starting the
creative process there is at least an implicit return-on-investment
(ROI) calculation that takes place: Is the expected return from the
effort sufficient to pay back the investment? The return, of course,
can also take other than financial forms, such as social prestige or
self-fulfillment. These non-financial motivations are, however, only
available when the creator is not forced to consider the investment
from a financial well-being perspective.
The investment needed for creating a copyrightable expression
can, of course, be diminished by using expression that has already
been created. At the extreme, copying someone else's work in its
entirety decreases the copier's creativity investment to zero. The
broader is the scope of copyright, the narrower is the opportunity for
subsequent creators to free-ride on previous expression. The
problem, however, is that in the broadest conceptual sense all new
creation is based on previous work. Would the musical West Side
55
Story have been written if Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet had not?
In copyright this ultimate question of the breadth of copyright is
encapsulated in the substantialsimilarity requirement. 6
54. For a more thorough discussion of this basic concept, see, for example, Mark A.
Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV.
989, 994 (1997).
55. COHEN, ET AL., supra note 28 at 7.
56. Courts throughout time have struggled with an objective formulation of
substantial similarity. These tests, such as the "idea-expression dichotomy" (see Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946)), "total concept and feel test" (see Roth Greeting
Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970)), or "ordinary observer test" (see
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977)) have all been criticized as fundamentally subjective, despite striving for
objectivity. The difficulty of the determination was highlighted in Judge Learned Hand's
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The societal optimization function comes from the need for
copyright to balance the two contravening forces: The increase of
copyright protection's incentive benefit from its inducing effect on
new creation, and the output-limiting effect that excessive protection
of copyrights would impose on society, including adverse effects on
new creation. As an example of this last point, if typical plotlines were
eligible for copyright, output would be impacted negatively because
film makers would be limited in their ability to use these customary
formats.
By specifying the societal benefit and cost functions it is possible
(in principle) to find the point at which the difference between the
aggregate incentive benefit and the aggregate access cost is
maximized. At any level of protection less than this point or beyond
this point the overall welfare to society is no longer maximized. This
phenomenon is commonly referred to as the "incentive-access
tradeoff"'5 7 and forms the bedrock of the model presented in Part IV.

early decision in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), where he
noted that he founded his decision on the conclusion that "the defendant took no more assuming that he took anything-than the law allowed." The more appropriate question
would seem to be how much does the law allow.
57. The paradigm is generally attributed to Kenneth Arrow's article Economic
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention in THE RATE AND DIRECTION
OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 617 (Universities - National Bureau Committee for
Economic Research 1962). See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 483, 485 n. 5 (1996). Prof. Lunney's article
presents a major criticism of the paradigm arguing that "[d]espite its enduring and
widespread popularity, however, the incentives-access paradigm is fundamentally flawed."
Id, at 486. He argues that, the inherent paradox in the paradigm's attempt to at the same
time protect incentives and access "leads inevitably to a copyright system that provides the
most protection for those works that society least needs, and the least protection for those
works society most needs." Id. at 487. The article also contends that "[f]rom an allocativeefficiency perspective, copyright provides the proper degree of protection when it ensures
that individuals will produce works of authorship if, and only if, such production would
represent the most highly valued use of their resources." Id, at 489. Both arguments,
however, introduce a qualitative element into the discussion not suitable for economic
analysis. How, other than subjectively, do we decide what works society needs most? How
is it possible, ex ante, to know whether an aspiring writer's resource investment induced by
copyright is an efficient allocation or not? Maybe he ends up writing a novel of "no value,"
but if, ex post, the fruit of his creation is the next "Da Vinci Code", then the answer is
quite likely "yes." The difficulty with Prof. Lunney's approach is highlighted in his
criticism that "copyright ensures individuals a higher price for their resources when
invested in an entertaining work than they would receive for investing in a useful work ....
even when the useful work ... is of greater value to society." Id, at 492. Who determines
what works are "entertaining" or "useful," or their respective "value to society"? Because
this article is supposed to be "useful," whereas Da Vinci Code was primarily
"entertaining," does it then follow that our article is of "more value to society"? We
respectfully decline any invitation to consider such comparisons.
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The academic literature analyzing the optimal extent of
intellectual property protection comes primarily from economists and
is focused primarily on patent protection. The most authoritative law
and economics discussion of copyright protection is that of William
Landes and Richard Posner in their 2003 book,58 which presents a
formal economic model for copyright. Before presenting a brief
survey of some of the other economics literature, we start with a
discussion and critique of some aspects of the Lander and Posner
presentation.
B. Summary of the Landes and Posner Model
One of the key insights of the Landes and Posner ("L&P")
model for this article is its affirmation of the incentive/access
tradeoff-i.e., recognition that the net societal surplus from the
copyright regime varies as a function of the level of copyright
protection. The authors posit an index "z" to connote the level of
protection, which includes both the length and the breadth of the
regulatory property grant, how similar the two works must be to
trigger infringements, the broadness of exceptions to exclusive rights
(e.g., fair use), the elements of the work that are protected, and the
efficacy and cost of enforcement.
Based on various assumptions, some of which are discussed
below, the authors conclude that at low levels of z the revenue
enhancing effect of limiting free-riding will dominate, and an increase
in protection will create net societal surplus from creative output; but
at a certain level of z access costs will begin to dominate, and the
regime no longer maximizes societal welfare through the inducement
of new output. The authors ascribe the value "z*" to the level of
protection that maximizes societal welfare from the copyright regime.
1. The Property Nature of z
Landes and Posner term the variable z as the "level of
protection."5 9 The variable could, however, more accurately be
described as the level of statutory propertizationof copyright claims.
Copyright, as is the case for any intellectual property, is a statutory
creature that exists only through polity grant. In other words, due to
the lack of possessory titles and an inherent inability to exclude, the
property characteristics of copyrights are to a much larger degree

58.

See Landes/Posner, supra note 7.

59.

Id. at 71 ("We denote the level of copyright protection by z > 0, so that z = 0

denotes no copyright protection and z = 1 signifies complete protection").
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than physical property dependent on the regulatory framework that

entitles the claimant to use the relevant polity's enforcement powers
to protect the entitlement. The higher the protection is, the more in
rem rights the claimants accumulate-most importantly the power to
exclude-and the more propertized the copyright claim becomes.
Understanding z as the level of statutory propertization means
that a value of z = 0 would represent no property rights-i.e., open
access where anyone can use the claimed subject matter freely.' As z
increases, the exclusionary rights of the claimant become stronger,
and z = 1 would represent a theoretical point where the claimant
could exercise "absolute" control over the copyrighted matter. At z =
1 copyright protection would be infinite in length, there would be no
affirmative defenses for use (e.g., fair use, First Amendment, de
minimis, etc.), no similarity would be allowed, enforcement would be
perfect and immediate, and so on. It is clear that z = 1, or anything
close to that, would be impossible ever to attain.
The variable z is central in the alternative model presented in the
next Part because this is the very factor that the legal system can
address. The extent to which property rights are granted to copyrights
is entirely a matter of policy. Once it is agreed that the United States
Constitution requires z to be set to maximize the net societal value of
the copyright regime through output and dissemination of creative
works, defining rights becomes a matter of economic modeling based
on empirical data to set the variable at the socially optimal level.
2.

Recognizing the Multiplicity of z for Different Dimensions of Regulation

Although in a simplified model a single aggregate point z* can be
derived by adding the weighted individual factors of the various
dimensions of z, it is important to recognize the separateness of each
individual attribute of z. Fundamentally these dimensions relate to a
temporal aspect (length) of the property grant as well as its
broadness-i.e., factors such as boundary issues (e.g., fair use, First
Amendment limitations), toleration of similarity, ease of
enforcement, and so on.6

An important third dimension of the

analysis is the cost and efficacy of enforcement. Because legal rights
60. The distinction between open access and a commons is worth noting here.
Whereas the commons is exhaustible, copyrights are not. The users' behavior will
therefore be different, because unlike in a commons where overgrazing will exhaust the
field, copyrighted matter is "eternal."
61. Takalo employs the variables T and w to connote the length and breadth of
protection, respectively. See Tuomas Takalo, On the Optimal Patent Policy, 14 FINNISH
ECON. PAPERS 33 (2001).
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that are costly or otherwise difficult to enforce constitute de facto a
lesser level of propertization than rights where relief can be obtained
at a low cost and in a timely manner. Thus, z is best thought of as
vector:

where z, to z. represent the various dimensions of the overall
property grant, such as length, the various factors making up breadth,
and the efficacy of enforcement.
It is entirely possible that in a given regime the length of the
protection exceeds its optimal value, but that at the same time the
breadth of protection (e.g., fair use) is too low.' Each dimension of
the regulatory scheme has its "own" z*, and the theoretically optimal
outcome would result only from setting each z* to its individual point
of optimality:
z* = (hlz*, + h2Z*2 + hz*3 + h 4z*4 . .+ hnz*) /n
where the corresponding factor h indicates the relative weight of each
of these dimensions. The matter is further complicated by the fact
that z* is different for each potential copyright claimant. But this
mathematical exercise can be overcome by recognizing that a
hypothetical "average" creator represents the outcome from a model
that aggregates all of the z*'s of potential creators.
C. Critique of the Landes and Posner Model
As is true of any economic model the L&P model employs
various assumptions that are necessary for the arithmetic calculations
used to solve the various economic equations. The following
paragraphs will critique two specific aspects of the model: the
assumption that the creative author's marginal cost of copies is
constant whereas the users' marginal costs of copies are escalating,

62. Or to put it differently, for the incentive to remain constant "if breadth is reduced
the optimal life must increase to compensate." Id. at 36; William D. Nordhaus, The
Optimal Life of the Patent: Reply, 62 AMER. ECON. REV. 428, 430 [hereinafter Nordhaus
II].
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and the broader rationale of tying the analysis to the number of

copies.
1. Assumptions A bout the Marginal Cost of Copies
The L&P model solves the various functions by analyzing the

supply of copies by the author and by others, and by deriving various
points of equilibrium through different forms of marginal cost
analysis. The costs for the author (A) consist of the fixed cost of
expression, e, and the variable cost of reproduction, c, with A's
marginal cost of copies (cA) assumed as constant, whereas for the
users (U) marginal costs (c,) are presumed to be escalating.
L&P openly admit that this assumption is necessary to make

their model work, but argue that it is also realistic. 63 L&P's argument
is that at a given level of z < 1 there will be copying by consumers and

other users that will be more costly and that, therefore, such
disparities "should generate differences in the cost of copying among
copiers" and consequently lead to increasing marginal costs.'

Fully understanding the need for L&P to incorporate this
assumption into their model to make it work, we nevertheless
question whether it is sufficiently realistic. The assumption is based
on an assertion that at any given level of z < 1 there will be "types of
copying that will be more costly," and from this L&P leap to the
conclusion that the copiers' marginal costs would be escalating.

However, it would seem that the escalating costs to the copier from
an increase in z would affect the fixed cost of expression, e0 , not
necessarily the copiers' marginal cost, of a unit, c,. So, while there will
be a difference in the cost to U at various levels of z, it does not
follow that the cost-enhancing effect of z on U manifests itself though

increasing the marginal cost (cu). A more accurate conclusion may be
70. Landes/Posner, supra note 7, at 72.
64. Id. In order to avoid any possible misrepresentation, we reproduce the full
passage (p. 72), which reads as follows: "More important, it is realistic to assume that
copiers will have increasing marginal costs. Recall the copying that takes place at a given
level of z is lawful. Some of it takes place by consumers (for example home taping of
television programs) and some by producers who incorporate the author's work into their
product (for example, fair use copying). The higher z is the less the amount of such lawful
copying. At a given level of z < 1, however, there will be some types of copying that
require consumers and producers to use only a small amount of their own resources. They
will be able to free ride on the author's work, so the cost of copying will tend to be low.
Other types of copying will be more costly, and here free riding will be less important.
Such differences should generate differences in the cost of copying amongst copiers and so
lead to rising marginal costs for the copiers as a group (rising because if demand falls,
more of it will be supplied by the copiers having the lowest marginal costs)." Id. (emphasis
in original).
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that instead the economic impact of z should be viewed as creating a
difference in the fixed costs of expression between A and U.
To illustrate the argument, let us assume that the marginal costs
of A and U are both constant, and moreover that they are equal. At
the extreme, at z = 0, the fixed cost of e to U would be zero because
there is no copyright protection and all expression is freely usable.
And with the marginal costs being constant and equal between A and
U there would be little opportunity for A to capture his initial fixed
creative investment eA. This demonstrates the obvious point that in
the absence of any copyright protection, investment in copyrightable
materials would not be justified on economic grounds. There could, of
course, still be creative expression that is motivated by other
incentives.65
As z increases, U will need to incorporate increasing amounts of
his own original expression into the work to prevent A from being
66
able to exercise his property rights under the copyright regime,
which pushes the fixed creative cost e u upward. It is important to
note, however, that eu can just as well be an investment in a new
expression that renders a license from A unnecessary. Or it could be
an investment that U makes to acquire rights to the expression from
A. Even if U acquires the totality of the expression from A, if his
variable costs are less than A's, then both can benefit by a license
from A to U. In fact, for example, the book publishing industry is
based on the premise that the variable costs of U (the publisher) are
lower than those of A (the author), which results in the motivation of
authors to license their works to publishers.
These examples are intended to demonstrate that the general
assumption that copyright users' marginal costs are higher than the
author's marginal costs is not quite as realistic as Landes and Posner
argue. The difficulty of this to the L&P model is that its mathematical
computations do not work unless their argument of higher marginal
costs for users is accepted.
2.

The Relevance of the Number of Copies

The L&P model is based on a notion that a "copy" is the driving
variable in copyright economics. It is certainly correct that publishers
continue to count the number of copies of books sold and record
companies count the copies of CDs sold and even the number of paid
65. See discussion about the existence of in IV.A., infra. The variable a refers to
the baseline creative output that would take place even in the absence of any copyright.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (permitting courts to grant injunctions to "prevent or restrain
infringement of a copyright").
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digital downloads. However, with increasing amounts of copyrighted
content becoming disseminated through various subscription models67
over the Internet, the copy as an economic unit loses some of its
significance.
Measuring the societal benefit and cost of copyright protection
through the number of copies produced and sold is specifically
questionable when the marginal cost of a "copy" is in many digital
contexts approaching zero. In this environment the more appropriate
economic index is the aggregate societal value' derivable from the
copyright and how the total value of a copyright should be shared
between authors, publishers, users, and society in the most efficient
manner.
The difficulty in attempting to pinpoint z* when applying the
L&P model's copy-centric view is highlighted when a copyrighted
work is adapted into a different medium. The movie "The Da Vinci
Code" is a licensed derivative work of the book by Dan Brown of the
same name. However, comparing the copies of the movie made from
a novel to copies of the original novel would not appear to be a
sensible exercise. In fact, counting "copies" of a film does not appear
to be a proper measure of the economic value of the work in any
instance, because the correlation between the number of prints of a
film and its economic output contribution to society is hazy at best.
And with the advent of digital distribution of practically all media the
fixation to measure the economic variables of copyright using the
concept of a "copy" will continue to decline in its meaningfulness.
D.

Other Economic Models for Intellectual Property

The academic analysis of intellectual property law has been
primarily focused on patent scope,69 and specifically patent length. A
founding discussion between Professors F.M. Scherer and William D.
Nordhaus over the model for an economically optimal patent regime

67. See, for example, the Napster To Go music subscription service where "For only
$14.95 a month, you can fill and refill your compatible MP3 player with your favorite
music, artists you've just discovered and the latest releases without paying 99¢ per track.
Get everything Napster has to offer PLUS unlimited music for your Napster To Gocompatible MP3 player." http://www.napster.com/ntg.html.
68. In light of our criticism in note 64, supra, of Prof. Lunney's use of "societal value"
in a way that injects a subjective notion of certain types of works' being more important
(and thereby more "valuable") to society, we measure societal value simply by the
aggregate monetary amount that the copyright is capable of extracting from a free
marketplace.
69. Interestingly, the patent literature leaps over the conceptual discussion of the
objective of the regime and implicitly accepts a utilitarian frame of mind.

2007]

AN ECONOMIC MODEL FOR THE INCENTIVE/ACCESS PARADIGM

379

ensued a quarter century ago.7" Scherer observes from an economist's
viewpoint the fundamental positive law school- legal premise by
noting that to the polity "patent life is a policy variable., 71 The
economic discussion focuses on the specifics of the incentive benefit
with the conclusion that "easy inventions-those yielding big cost
savings in relation to the research resources invested-warrant
shorter patent protection than hard inventions."72 Despite the

economics merits of Professor Scherer's suggestion, the notion that
intellectual property grants would be tied to the investment made

would leave courts with an impossible task of adjudicating the fair
value of non-monetary investment.73
In his response to Scherer, Professor Nordhaus reaches three

conclusions: (1) a fixed property grant term is not optimal in theory;
(2) the inducement of "drastic inventions" requires a longer patent
grant; and (3) compulsory licensing would lower the level of

investment in inventions. 7' The first and second observations
essentially correspond with Scherer's argument, and suffer from the
same flaws. The third statement recapitulates the premise of the
incentive benefit function-i.e., that there is a positive correlation
between the property

grant and the level of investment.

A

compulsory licensing regime is essentially a limitation on the property
grant, and similarly as any reduction in the property grant will
suppress incentives to invest so would compulsory licensing."5

Another exchange of commentary took place in 1990 between
Professor Paul Klemperer and Professors Richard Gilbert and Carl

70. William D. Nordhaus, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE [hereinafter Nordhaus I]; F.M. Scherer,
Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometrical Reinterpretation, 62 AMER.
ECON REV. 422 (1972); Nordhaus II, supra note 62.
71. Scherer, supra note 70, at 423. Presumably, for a natural theorist the decision
would not be a policy decision due to the "inherent" rights entitlement that the creator
possesses irrespective of polity grant.
72. Id. at 426.
73. For example, would a novelist who took a year to write a book be entitled to
more protection than the novelist who wrote a comparable book in six months because the
time investment by the prior was greater?
74. Nordhaus II, supranote 70, at 430-431.
75. In this respect it is worth noting the increasing impact of compulsory licenses,
such as section 114 of the Copyright Act, which creates for a statutory license for certain
uses of sound recordings. If as part of the digital evolution the channels of exploitation
governed under sections 114 would come to represent a significant segment of the
industry, this could predictably have an output-curtailing effect for sound recording
production because compulsory rates may be below market-determined levels.
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Shapiro.76 Klemperer's article demonstrates economic conditions

where a short but broad patent grant would generate more societal
surplus, and compares them with situations where the opposite is the
case; Gilbert and Shapiro observe that the optimization of social
welfare depends on a policy decision with respect to two variables:
length and breadth. The article presents an economic justification that

a combination of longer patent term with a compulsory licensing
scheme would result in socially optimal results.

An interesting European contribution to the discussion is
Tuomas Takalo's 2001 article, 7 which recapitulates the foundation
economics study of the subject matter and attempts to synthesize the
various models presented. Takalo focuses the policy issue on the
public good aspect of intellectual property-i.e., its inherent
characteristics of being inexhaustible and non-excludable. 7 After
observing that the economic modeling of intellectual property rights
has been "convoluted and characterized by subtle points of
inconclusive controversy,, 79 Takalo presents as his conclusion that if
the length of protection has a large impact on the incentive to
innovate then the property grant should be of minimum breadth and
maximum length. If the converse is true, then the property grant
should have maximum breadth and minimum length.'
In proving his proposition Takalo focuses on the interplay
between the private and social returns on innovation, and formulates
his proposition from scenarios where the private return function with

76. Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent ProtectionBe? 21 RAND
J. ECON. 113 (1990); Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and

Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990).
77. Takalo, supra note 61.
78. For further discussion on the public goods nature of intellectual property, see,
e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On the Economics of Copyright, Restitution, and "Fair Use":
Systemic Versus Case-by-Case Responses to Market Failure, 8 J. LAW & INFO. SCI. 7, 10
(1997) ("Public goods are defined by having two characteristics, inexhaustibility and
nonexcludability"); John Edwards, Has the Dreaded Data Doomsday Arrived? Past,
Present and Future Effects of the European Union's Database Directive on Databaseand
Information Availability in the European Union, 39 GA. L. REV. 215, 220 (2004) (citing
J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data? 50 VAND. L.
REV. 51, 55 (1997) ("Information goods are public goods, which means that they are
inexhaustible and nondepletable").).
79. Takalo, supra note 61, at 35 (quoting P.A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions
and the Panda's Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and
History, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY (M.B. Wallerstein, et al. eds., National Academy Press 1993).
80. Id. at 36. Takalo also proposes that "if the relative impacts [to the incentive to
invest] of patent breadth and length are equal,.. social welfare is independent of the
combination of patent breadth and length." Id.
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respect to either the length or breadth of protection is convex versus
situations where the function is concave. Takalo does not, however,
differentiate between the impact of changes to the property grant
with respect to private return and level of investment. While an
increasing property grant may well be a convex function with respect
to private return-due to the increasing opportunities for strategic
behavior 8 1-this does not translate to the incentive to invest being
convex, and in fact as discussed in Section A of the next Part, infra,
we argue that the incentive to invest function is always concave.
A leading exposition on the economics of patent grants from the
legal community's side is Professors Robert P. Merges and Richard R.
Nelson's 1990 article "On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope".8 The authors' conclusions include pointing out the
inefficiencies of the "race to invent" model and the blocking effects of
broad patents. Merges and Nelson also note that variable patent
grants tied to the investment and nature of the invention would result
in societal efficiencies.
As a result of the independent creation doctrine, the "race to
invent" problem is not a consideration in copyright law. The blocking
effect of patents as well as copyrights is a fundamental aspect of the
offsetting access-cost to the incentive-benefit discussed in the
following model. A system of variable intellectual property grants
would undoubtedly be economically optimal, but as a practical matter
the cost of administrating such a system would likely make it inferior.
More importantly, the ex ante uncertainty as to the property grant
would likely result in the incentive-benefit of the regime being
substantially undercut. In any event, on a pragmatic level variable
copyright grants are not a realistic policy objective and are therefore
ignored in the following discussion.
A major recent exposition on the economics of intellectual
property was presented by Professor Suzanne Scotchmer in her 2004

81. For example, let us assume that the substantial similarity requirement for
infringement (a sub-variable of copyright breadth) is decreased-i.e., that less similar
works would be considered infringing. For a copyright owner of a tragic story involving
two lovers from rival families the increased breadth of expanding their ability to claim any
depiction of a tragic story involving two such lovers to be infringing would give the
company a substantial private benefit. If the breadth would be expanded further to bring
in any love story within the sphere of the copyright owner's proprietary rights, the private
benefit would be exponentially greater, suggesting a convex slope. This, however, is
entirely different from the function of what property grant was needed to induce the
original creation of the story.
90. Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).

382

HASTINGS COMMJENT L.J.

[29:3

book INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES.83 The book independently

reaffirms an L&P-like conception of the existence of z* by
referencing Nordhaus and noting that an increase in the property
grant "may not be beneficial from a societal point of view." 8 The
book also acknowledges that a very high z on certain aspects of
copyright breadth would result in the "transaction costs of licensing
copyrighted works for incidental use to be prohibitive," implicitly

acknowledging the economic necessity of the fair use doctrine of
copyright.85
Despite being at the highest academic standards for economic
writing, these articles and models have one thing in common: They do

not present a cohesive framework sufficiently simple for the legal
community or the legislature to use as a practical analytical tool for
the evaluation of policy decisions. In the following we attempt to
remedy this, and present an economic model that captures the

essence of the incentive/access paradigm in a way that can be used by
legislators and practitioners to evaluate the social welfare impact of
changes to copyright law.

IV. A Model for Copyright to Maximize Societal Welfare
The

following

presents

an

economic

modeling

of

the

incentive/access tradeoff that corresponds to the output and societal
welfare-maximizing objective of the Constitutional utilitarian
mandate of the Copyright Clause. 86 Since Landes and Posner did not

present such an approach in their book and a survey of other
materials did not reveal such a model having been set forth,' what
83.

SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004).

84. Id. at 99 (citing Nordhaus I).
85. Id. at 115.
86. As a post-script to the positive law/natural law discussion, supra, it should be
noted that natural law could not form a basis for the economic analysis of copyright.
Economically each author would generally prefer the broadest possible copyright scope;
i.e., z = 1. Since this is not possible as a practical matter, the policy decision as to how
much to limit the copyright grant under a natural law approach would have to be done on
other grounds-primarily subjective moral determinations-because economically any
curtailment would be against the pure economic interest of the primary stakeholder, the
author. This would first appear to suggest that the broadest possible copyright would be in
the entertainment industry's best interest. However, entertainment companies cannot, per
se, be authors because it is exclusively a human activity. The entertainment industry
acquires copyrights in different ways. Under a pure natural law interpretation it is the
creative staff-the "laborers" as Locke would put it-at the entertainment conglomerates
whose rights would be emphasized.
87. The underlying notion of Nordhaus II, supra note 69, and Takalo, supra note 68,
of pitting protection length against breadth is relevant but not analogous to the proposal
presented here. Of course, the importance of breadth versus length may vary from
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follows is an initial economic framework to outline the principles of

the incentive/access paradigm, and pinpoint the societally optimal
point z*.
A.

Benefit to Society from Protection of Copyright

The simple conceptual premise of the incentive benefit is that the
more that copyrights are propertized-i.e., the higher as a policy
decision z is set-the more opportunity the copyright claimant has to
recover his investment and earn a return on it,8 and, consequently,
the more incentive there is to invest resources in the production of
copyrightable works.' This investment is (in the following) termed
the incentive-benefit of copyright protection, or I. As the legal system
increases z, the incentive for authors to invest to produce
copyrightable works grows,' and society can expect more creative
output." Therefore, the starting premise is that I is a positive
function of z:
I f(z)
dI/dz = f'(z) > 0.

The societal incentive can be aggregated from the individual
incentive curves of individual actors. Consequently, setting aside the
situation to situation, but this will merely result in a change in the slope of the incentive
function. Both length and breadth are independently subject to the functions presented in
this Section.
88. The investment can be either financial or that of intellectual labor or genius.
Although the United States copyright regime does not reward the "sweat of the brow"
(Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)), it is safe to
note that, for example, writing a novel requires labor and not just creativity.
89. This is consistent with the Demsetzian brand of utilitarian property theory-i.e.,
increased propertization results in more investment. See, Harold Demsetz, Toward a
Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). For examples of the broad
academic literature generated by Demsetz's article, see, e.g., Katrina Wyman, From Fur to
Fish:Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005), n.1.
90. Landes and Posner term this the "revenue-enhancing effect," as opposed to the
"cost-enhancing effect" of the related externalities.
91. As is clear in the text below, we posit a link between the author's investment (I)
and expected creative output and between that output and societal benefits. Nadel, n.9,
supra, challenges the fundamental premise that increasing z will increase creative output
and argues that increased propertization leads to a winner-take-all environment where
investment in marketing will, in fact, create a barrier to entry for economically marginal
creators. Marketing, however, relates to a business effort by the proprietor to develop the
underlying copyrighted work into a brand-i.e., a trademark. This is conceptually no
different from a pharmaceutical company's marketing a new drug, where the company is
taking a patent and turning that into a trademark. The societal objectives of trademarks
are entirely different from those of copyright, including issues such as the reduction of
search costs for consumers, and providing an incentive for the trademark owners to
maintain the quality of their products. Since this article focuses exclusively on copyright
production, we leave these considerations aside.
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complex modeling that this would entail, the correct end result can be
reached by simply considering the societal incentive curve to be
identical to that of the common legal fiction of the "average" creator.
An important feature of I is, however, that there is a base level of
investment that is made even at the point z = 0. This factor, labeled a,
represents the amount of creative investment that would be made
even in the absence of any copyright propertization. 9 Of course, such
investment may not be (strictly) economically justified (i.e., authors
could create as part of recreation rather than as a profit-driven effort,
or they could be "driven" to create), but as an empirical fact it does
not seem controversial that certain creative output would occur for
other reasons than potential for economic reward.
The other key feature of the incentive benefit is that as z grows
the marginal increase of I diminishes; i.e.,
d2I/dz2 = f"(z) < 0.
This phenomenon is easily understood conceptually by first
considering z in the context of real property. Let us assume that the
Nevada desert is infinite, that it has some oil deposits, and that it is all
state-owned property. The state wants to induce exploration by
increasing the incentives to potential oil drillers. In order to reduce
free-riding by subsequent drillers on found oil deposits, it establishes
a program whereby anyone willing to drill a hole will get a property
grant of an acre around the drilling place. This program results in
some drilling, but the state feels that society would benefit if there
would be more exploration (and therefore more output of oil), so the
property grant is increased to two acres. The exploration increases
because oil explorers have less of a concern that if they do hit oil
someone would drill so close as to drain the same oil pool.
The state, however, feels that still more exploration would be
beneficial, so it continues to increase the size of the property grant. In
doing so the incentives to explore continue to rise, but the

92. On the existence of a > 0, see Landes and Posner at 22 ("We know this because
an enormous quantity (and quality) was produced before [copyright existed] and even
today a great deal.. .would be produced if [copyright] did not exist."); David Nimmer,
Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1, 135
(2001) (discussing incentives to create and noting that within academia "the impetus.. .lies
in other domains-university posts, research grants, scholarships founded on the
commonweal, fame, recognition, and attribution"). Also, there may be other means,
besides copyright protection, whereby the author can gain economic benefits. Direct
contractual arrangements between the author and users may be one means; another may
arise in the case of physical works of art, where the creator may be able to benefit from
selling the authenticated "original." Also, in another realm of intellectual propertypatents-trade secrets are an alternative means of gaining benefits for the creator.
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incremental increase in exploration from the larger grant will be
diminishing. This is because potential explorers will likely believe that
the difference between a two-acre grant and a one-acre grant is much
more significant than the difference between an eleven-acre grant and
a ten-acre grant. Doubling the initially small property grant serves to
eliminate a much greater competitive threat to the explorer compared
to the same absolute increase in the property grant amounting only to
a 10% expansion from the previous state.
Now substitute for the desert the infinite space of creative
expression, and for the oil explorer the creator of a work of
authorship. Similar to the oil explorer, the same absolute increase in
property protection induces investment in creation more when z is
low compared to a situation where the creator already has a
substantial property grant. This is not to say that the private value to
the claimant would not always increase linearly, or even
exponentially.93 If weak copyright is strengthened, the increase in z
will foreclose direct competition and preserve the claimant's property
where it is most valuable-"near" the drilling hole. An increase of z
of the same amount when protection is already broad will not
incentivize the author as much, because in such a situation the
property expansion is likely in markets that the claimant does not
consider in evaluating the investment to create.
The phenomenon can also be looked at from the viewpoint of
regulation. Let us assume that the City of New York sells exclusive
business licenses for specific geographic areas to restaurant
entrepreneurs. The license is, however, limited to only allowing the
establishment of one restaurant. In such a situation, a bigger
geographic area of exclusivity would induce more potential restaurant
entrepreneurs to apply for the license and pay the fee. However, a
one-block increase that doubles the grant will induce more new
restaurant license applications than would an increase of one block if
the original area is already ten blocks. This is because the difference
in whether a competing restaurant is eleven or twelve blocks away
matters much less compared to whether it is one block away or two
blocks away. As the competing restaurant is pushed farther away,
there is less direct competition anyway, so the increase in the

93. In fact, as copyrights broaden, the exclusionary rights of the claimant may enable
it to engage in more strategic behavior and enable it to extract increased returns. This,
however, is entirely separate from the determination of the threshold propertization
needed for the claimant to engage in the activity. Of course, the oil driller would prefer
that the entire Nevada desert be awarded to him for drilling one hole, but what is relevant
here is only how much is necessary to induce him to make the investment.
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property grant represents less of an incentive for the contemplating
entrepreneur.
The preceding discussion of the incentive benefit of copyright
propertization implies that the relationship between creative
investments and the extent of propertization is a concave function.
One specific characterization of this functional relationship would be:
I = a + log (z)
where a represents the base level amount of creative investment that
would exist absent any copyright protection and the logarithmic
function indicates the additional output that increased copyright
propertization induces. The graphical illustration of the incentive
benefit is portrayed in Figure 1:
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Investment,
benefit

0

1 z
(level of propertization)
Figure 1: The Incentive Benefit Relationship

The diminishing marginal increase in the incentive as z increases
applies to both the breadth and the length of copyright protection.
With respect to copyright length the obvious conclusion is that a oneyear increase when the term is short is a more powerful incentive than
when the term is already long. This is partly due to psychological
factors: it is much easier for a creator to comprehend an improvement
in the low end than when protection already is substantial. From an
economic standpoint the lesser value of an extension farther out is
due to discounting and also to the increased risk that the work of
authorship has by then been commercially exhausted.
If we relate this back to the oil drilling example, if the grants by
the state would be temporally limited, then a one-year increase from
100 to 101 years would induce less incremental drilling than an
increase from 10 to 11 years. In addition to discounting, this is also
because it is less likely that even if oil is found the pool would still
generate value after a hundred years than it is that the pool would do
so after ten years.
The analysis above focused on the ex ante incentives of private
investment, but it can be transposed directly to depict the societal
benefit side of copyright propertization through the following steps:
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1. Increase in the property grant induces incremental
creation;
2. Incremental creation results in more output;
3. Creative output has societal value;
4. Therefore, the increase in the societal value is a function
of the increase in output, which in turn is a function of
private incentives to creative investment.
This allows the investment (F) in works of authorship to be
linked with an average societal value (v), and the societal welfare (W)
created by the copyright system can thereby be calculated as the
perpetually discounted product of the two, or:
W= (I v)/ r
where r represents the discount rate.
B.

Cost to Society from Protection of Copyright

The societal cost of the protection is the limit that it puts on the
copying of already created works and on the creation of new output,
because potential authors and investors in creativity are
disincentivized by a concern that, e.g., their work would be considered
infringing due to a too close similarity to a previous work. As z
increases the "space" left for new creation diminishes, which in turn
creates a social cost through its output limiting effects discussed
above. In applying the incentive/access tradeoff terminology, this is
labeled the access-cost, or C, of copyright protection.
What makes C somewhat more complex than I is that it is the
sum of two independent factors: (1) the costs that would exist in a
frictionless society-i.e., the Coasean94 utopia of no transaction costs
(Cq), and (2) costs related to market imperfections (Cm). The Coasean
(frictionless society) cost arises from the ability to price above
marginal costs9-a phenomenon necessary for the claimant to recoup

94. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The
"Coase Theorem" is commonly used to describe a society where transaction costs are zero,
and in which therefore under Prof. Coase's framework the allocation of resources is most
efficiently done bilaterally by the societal actors.
95. We have refrained from describing copyright in terms of "monopoly," because
the latter term seems inappropriate to describe a system in which hundreds of thousands
of new pieces of property are created every year. Instead, like real estate, every piece of
copyright property is unique and different from each other. They compete to greater or
lesser extents (imperfectly) with each other. The models of "monopolistic competition"
and "imperfect competition," developed by Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson,
respectively, seem more appropriate. See EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, (7th ed. 1960); and JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF
IMPERFECT COMPETITION (2d ed. 1969).
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the initial fixed investment in the copyrighted content. The marketimperfection-related costs include primarily transaction costs, search
costs, and the cost of enforcement.9
1. FrictionlessSociety Costs of Copyright
The societal cost of copyright in a frictionless society can also be
demonstrated using the oil exploration and restaurant examples of
the previous section. As the property grants for oil explorers are
increased, the increase in the incentive to drill is offset by the inability
of others to drill in areas that are now demarcated by prior explorers.
As the size of the property grants increases, the disincentive for
drilling by newcomers escalates as they will be pushed progressively
farther away from areas where oil has been found. This may enable
the property claimant to "rest on its laurels" or extract monopoly
rents for drilling rights from second-comers that will reduce drilling,
and thereby reduce output and increase the price of oil to consumers.
Similarly, in the restaurant example, a very large exclusive area
would have a social cost simply as a result of there being fewer
restaurants. There would be less competition (i.e., higher prices) as
well as longer distances for consumers to travel to get to one.
In the copyright context the Coasean costs can best be
understood in the context of a specific dimension of z, such as the
requirement of similarity. If z is increased-i.e. the requirement for
similarity is lessened-output would be curtailed because, e.g., film
studios would have more exposure against claims that their
production is "similar" (although not "substantially similar") with
something previously created. In the same vein, if z would be
increased so that a single word would constitute copyrighted
expression, future output would be nearly impossible because authors
would be impaired in their ability to create with a substantial part of
the terrain from which to draw for their creation being already
"staked out."
The Coasean costs increase as z increases because this will bring
increasing numbers of works within the proprietary scope of their
original claimants, and allow the type of strategic behavior discussed
above.
Unlike the incentive benefit, however, the shape of the
relationship between Coasean costs and z is difficult to specify a
priori.On the one hand, extending the copyright term generally has a

96. Landes and Posner do not draw a distinction between frictionless and market
imperfection costs. See Landes & Posner, supra note 7.
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declining marginal cost aspect: The present value of the costs of users'
waiting an extra year when the copyright term is being extended from
75 to 76 years is smaller than when the term is being extended from 3
years to 4 years; this would imply the same concavity that applies to
the incentive benefit. With respect to the breadth of propertization,
an increase in z could imply either falling or rising marginal social
costs. The mathematical depiction of the Coasean cost is therefore
Cq = g(z)
dCq/dz > 0
d2Cq/dz 2 > 0 or < 0
where the g costs represent the societal value of the access loss
imposed by the property regime.
2.

Market Imperfection Related Costs of Copyright

The non-Coasean costs with respect to copyright are much
greater for copyrights than they would be for oil exploration or
restaurant licenses. This is because of the cumulative nature of
copyrights, also referred to as the OTSOG principle. 97 Unlike oil
drilling, where each new hole is started from inception, 8 works of
authorship are by their nature connected to a social context and draw
on ideas and concepts from works before them. Although copyright
law enshrines the "idea/expression dichotomy," a bright line between
the two is not conceptually possible. Rather, a higher level of z
connotes that more abstract concepts would be copyrightable. At the
extreme, the storyline (and not the specific expressive elements) of
West Side Story might become infringing of Shakespeare's work
(assuming perpetual copyright). The limitation on the authors and
producers of West Side Story to proceed without a license from the
Shakespeare estate would have created a societal loss different in
kind from the oil drilling or restaurant license examples.
A broad copyright grant also enables copyright claimants to
engage in strategic behavior-e.g., by leveraging the copyright to
accomplish anti-competitive ends.' An example of such opportunistic
97. Lemley, supra note 54, at 997 n.30 ("The most famous formulation of this
phenomenon is credited to Sir Isaac Newton, who reportedly said, "If I have seen further
it is by standing on the shoulders of giants." THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
362 (3d ed. 1979). This is occasionally referred to in computer law as the OTSOG ("On
the Shoulders of Giants") principle"). Again, in a Coasean world the parties would be able
to bargain to a mutually advantageous agreement that would allow the subsequent creator
to build upon the earlier work (so long as greater social value is created in the process).
98. Although subsequent drillers may be able to learn from earlier drillers-e.g., about
successful (or unsuccessful) technologies, geological conditions, etc.
99.
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behavior was seen in Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television,
126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997), where the plaintiff asserted a violation of
her display right when an authorized poster depicting her work was
used in the background of a scene for a television program.
The other market-imperfection-related costs arise from
inherently unique characteristics of copyrights, most importantly their
fuzzy metes and bounds." ° Unlike tangible property, which can be
demarcated precisely, the perimeters of a copyright grant are always
abstract. The broader the grant, the more situations there will be
where the limits of the property right may have been crossed. This
will drive up both transaction and enforcement costs.
The market-friction-related costs (i.e., transaction, search, and
enforcement costs) are not linear but rather are likely to form a
convex function. The reason for this can be more easily illustrated
with a limitation on de minimis use: the smaller is the allowance (i.e.,
the higher z is), the lower the trigger for a secondary creator to need
to find and obtain a license from every prior copyright claimant
whose work could be in any way incorporated into the secondary
creation. This will result in an escalating number of small licenses
where the search and transaction costs would make the secondary
output impossible. While in a frictionless society this additional
licensing will not impose more than linearly increasing societal cost,
the need for a copyright user to search and transact with increasing
numbers of parties who may claim an interest in the secondary work
due to a prior copyright will result in exponentially growing
transaction and search costs.
The same logic can be applied to a fair use analysis. As fair use is
progressively limited (i.e., z is increased), this will drive up
transaction costs exponentially as z becomes very high (i.e., when
there is practically no fair use safety valve). For example, if every
private photocopy of a newspaper article would require a formal
license, the sheer number of transactions would become astronomical.
The mere transactional costs of such a regime would engulf much of
the societal benefit of the regime.

100. The metes and bounds of a physical object are easy to ascertain by simply
observing the object. While disputes over the metes and bounds of real property are, or at
least have been, common, it is possible to draw a border and ultimately, perhaps through
judicial means, determine with high precision where one property ends and another
begins. The metes and bounds of copyrights are not susceptible to any determinative
clarity as to how far they extend. See, also, Stewart E. Sterk, What's in a Name?: The
Troublesome Analogies Between Real and Intellectual Property, CARDOZO L. LEGAL

STUD. RES. PAPER No. 88 (Aug. 10, 2004), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=575121.
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As z increases, the judicial enforcement costs will also rise
exponentially because there will necessarily be more claims of
infringement, and claims of overlapping rights. In terms of copyright
length, it has been argued that very long protection would likely begin
inducing an anti-commons effect because older rights are more likely

to be splintered either between heirs or various partial assignees or
licensees.'O1

Consequently, the functional relationship between these market
imperfection costs (Cm) and z could be described as follows:
C = h(z)
dC/dz = h'(z) > 0
d 2 Cm/dZ2 = h"(z) > 0.
One characterization of the slope of the societal cost of the
copyright system from market imperfections could therefore be
exponential, or:

C =zY
with y > 1.0.
Consequently the total function C would consist of:
C = g(z) + Z ,

which we represent in Figure 2:'0'

101. The conceptual premise of the anti-commons is that whereas the tragedy of the
commons results in over-exploitation, rights that are splintered so as to enable holdouts
opportunistically to prevent economic exploitation of resources creates a similar tragedy:
that of under-exploitation. See, generally, Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the AntiCommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621
(1998)
102. The total access costs CrOTAL is the sum of the Coasean costs described in Section
IV. B.1. and the market imperfection costs (C,.) discussed in Section IV. B.2. For the
purposes of approximation in the diagram, we have portrayed the Coasean costs as linear.

2007]

AN ECONOMIC MODEL FOR THE INCENTIVE/ACCESS PARADIGM

393

C
CTOTAL

Cq

0

'

lz
(level of propertization)
Figure 2: The Access Cost Relationship

These costs can also be seen directly as aggregate societal costs
of the property regime because they will directly offset the benefits
created by the incentive. Access costs manifest themselves as actually
limiting output; in other words output that would have otherwise
occurred as a result of the incentive benefit will not occur because of
the more-than-offsetting access costs. It is important to note that on
the cost side there is no equivalent of a, and that access costs at z = 0
are zero because in a system of no intellectual rights protection there
would be no societal cost: since everything is freely usable, the value
of the work is immediately conveyed to society.
C.

Optimal Level of Copyright Protection

The societal net outcome of the copyright regime can be derived
by combining the incentive benefit and access cost functions, which
we portray in Figure 3:
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Figure 3: The Incentive/Access Paradigm

Since the net benefit is the vertical difference between the
incentive benefit and access cost, we can portray the net societal
welfare (N) simply as:
N=W-C.
The graphic portrayal of this function in Figure 4 creates an
inverted parabola, which allows us easily to identify several points on
the continuum 0 < z < 1. First, at z = 0 there is a net benefit to society,
because even in the absence of any copyright protection there would
be some creative works produced. However, as z increases we see
that the net benefit to society increases, ultimately reaching the
maximizing point of z*. After z* the net benefit diminishes, ultimately
sinking below the level that would be the case with no protection.

2007]

AN ECONOMIC MODEL FOR THE INCENTIVE/ACCESS PARADIGM

395

N

0

z*

1z
(level of propertization)

Figure 4: The Net Benefit-Cost of Propertization
The quantification of the theoretical point for the aggregate z* is
likely an impossible task. It would, however, appear possible to
investigate the proper level of z at least with respect to some of its
sub-dimensions. More importantly, it might be helpful if societal
decision makers would view the issue of copyright protection by
applying the type of thinking presented in the model. Certainly, the
model is implicitly used by both Congress in their efforts to devise the
best possible copyright policy. 103
At its extreme, truly to maximize the net societal surplus from
copyright the levels of z would likely need to be set differently for
different types of copyrightable subject matter.1 " For example, the
substantial financial investment required to make a feature film likely
would necessitate more property protection to sustain sufficient
output compared to novelists, whose investment is primarily time.
However, as a practical matter, a regime that would distinguish
between the types of end products would likely be unwieldy so the
model would serve the most purpose as a broad level guideline for

103. In addition to fair use (17 U.S.C. §107) the Copyright Act contains numerous
provisions where Congress has limited the exclusive rights of the copyright owners,
ostensibly for the very reason discussed above, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§108-111
104. See discussion in Section III D, supra; specifically Professor Scherer's and
Nordhaus's notion that a fixed property grant is not optimal.
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V. Orphan Works: A Practical Application of the Model
Although a precise numeric application of the model is likely to
be empirically impossible, its conceptual ease lends it to be used when
changes to the copyright regime are contemplated. Any change to
copyright law is in essence a change in z - by altering the status quo,
the property grant on some dimension of the various aspects of
copyright will be either strengthened or weakened as a result of the
change. In the following, the model is applied to the Orphan Works
Act, which would add a new Section §514 to the Copyright Act.
The Copyright Office issued a 133 page report to Congress
entitled "Report on Orphan Works" in January 2006.105 The report

was prepared in response to requests by Senators Orrin Hatch and
Patrick Leahy, who would likely be sponsors of the new legislation
proposed by the Copyright Office.
A.

Orphan Works Act

The Orphan Works Act contains a new section §514 to be added
to the Copyright Act.' °6 The proposed statutory language provides
105. REPORT on ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 3.
106. The language of the bill provides: SECTION 514: LIMITATIONS ON
REMEDIES: ORPHAN WORKS
(a) Notwithstanding sections 502 through 505, where the infringer:
(1) prior to the commencement of the infringement, performed a good faith, reasonably
diligent search to locate the owner of the infringed copyright and the infringer did not
locate that owner, and
(2) throughout the course of the infringement, provided attribution to the author and
copyright owner of the work, if possible and as appropriate under the circumstances,
the remedies for the infringement shall be limited as set forth in subsection (b).
(b) LIMITATIONS ON REMEDIES
(1) MONETARY RELIEF
(A) no award for monetary damages (including actual damages, statutory damages,
costs or attorney's fees) shall be made other than an order requiring the infringer to pay
reasonable compensation for the use of the infringed work; provided, however, that
where the infringement is performed without any purpose of direct or indirect
commercial advantage, such as through the sale of copies or phonorecords of the
infringed work, and the infringer ceases the infringement expeditiously after receiving
notice of the claim for infringement, no award of monetary relief shall be made.
(2) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
(A) in the case where the infringer has prepared or commenced preparation of a
derivative work that recasts, transforms or adapts the infringed work with a significant
amount of the infringer's expression, any injunctive or equitable relief granted by the
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that when an infringer has "performed a good faith, reasonably
diligent search to locate the owner" but failed to do so the subsequent

remedies of the copyright owner are limited.

7

Specifically, "no

award for monetary damages shall be made other than requiring the

infringer to pay reasonable compensation for the use of the infringed
work."' Similarly, unlike under the general provisions of the
Copyright Act, the copyright owner will not be granted injunctive
relief to prevent the copyright user from moving forward with his use

so long as reasonable compensation is paid.
The Orphan Works Act has been introduced in response to the
Copyright Office's factual finding that "the orphan works problem is
real."'

The Copyright Office's Report expressly recognizes that the

inability of a potential user to obtain the necessary licenses for the
copyright will result in the "productive and beneficial use of the work

[being] forestalled."" 0 This statement recognizes that the orphan
works problem is one of suppression of output. Derivative works that
could be created based on existing copyrights cannot be made
because risk-averse secondary users are not able to secure necessary
licenses. Such potential investors are precluded from the market
when there is a possibility that the owner of the original copyright will
emerge and demand excessive remuneration under the threat of an

infringement suit and an injunction. As the Report notes the situation
caused by the orphan works problem is not consistent with the public
interest,i' an objective of the copyright regime that the Copyright

Office thereby affirms.
court shall not restrain the infringer's continued preparation and use of the derivative
work, provided that the infringer makes payment of reasonable compensation to the
copyright owner for such preparation and ongoing use and provides attribution to the
author and copyright owner in a manner determined by the court as reasonable under the
circumstances; and
(B) in all other cases, the court may impose injunctive relief to prevent or restrain the
infringement in its entirety, but the relief shall to the extent practicable account for any
harm that the relief would cause the infringer due to the infringer's reliance on this
section in making the infringing use.
(c) Nothing in this section shall affect rights, limitations or defenses to copyright
infringement, including fair use, under this title.
(d) This section shall not apply to any infringement occurring after the date that is ten
years from date of enactment of this Act. REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 3,
at 127.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 7.
110. Id. at 15.
111. Id.
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Economic Analysis of the Orphan Works Act

Since the Orphan Works Act entails a lowering of z, the
expectation is that it will reduce both the incentive-benefit and the
access-cost. In the event that the diminution of the welfare resulting
from the negative impact from the incentive-benefit is more than
offset by the societal benefit of the reduced access costs, then the
movement from za to zb will have been in the direction of z*, as is

portrayed in Figure 5:
N

0

Z* Zba

z

(level of propertization)
Figure 5: The Net Benefit-Cost of Propertization

In the case of orphan works, at least in the limits that the Orphan
Works Act entails, there is no possibility of a real debate about the
matter. The reduction in the incentive-benefit would result from
prospective creators being less motivated to make the necessary
investment, because of their fears that their ability to extract control
over the work will be diminished if the work should later be
considered an orphan work. In essence, the proposal imposes an
additional cost to the copyright claimant to inform the marketplace of
its claim to the copyright and make his contact information available
for possible licensing requests."2 It is implicit that this concern will
have a minuscule impact on creative investment. Investment decisions
112. In a sense the Orphan Works proposal draws the sibling bodies of law of
copyright and trademark closer; the Copyright Office's proposal brings into copyright
what is essentially an abandonment doctrine that is well enshrined in trademark law.
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in a creative work are highly unlikely to be discouraged as a result of
this concern. At the time of the decision to engage in creative
production, the thought of the work's later being of interest to a
potential user, but this user's not being able to locate the copyright
owner, is a remote consideration. The reduction in output as a result
of this change will likely be nearly non-existent.
In contrast, on the access-cost side, the elimination of the
barriers to use of orphan works can have a substantial outputenhancing impact. Under the present situation a copyright user has to
incur substantial search costs in his attempt to locate the copyright
owner. And, despite the investment, he may be unable to proceed,
not because of an inability to agree on terms of use by the owner, but
because the owner cannot be located. By analogy this could be
viewed as a situation where an antique restorer finds a piece in a trash
to renovate it because of his inability to find
bin, but is not allowed
13
it.1
discarded
who
Although a specific numeric analysis is not possible, a direct
conceptual application of the model presented to the orphan works
problem would indicate that the Orphan Works Act is consistent with
the Constitutional objectives of copyright. The model presented in
this article could be used as a tool in an express economic analysis of
the societal benefits and costs of proposed changes, similar to what is
customarily done with respect to policy decisions relating to antitrust.
VI. Conclusion
This article has presented a straightforward model for copyright
that sets out the incentive/access paradigm in economic terms. The
model suggests that for each dimension of copyright propertization, a
social welfare maximizing point could be derived through empirical
analysis. The article contends that in order for the copyright system to
meet the utilitarian goals of the Constitution, Congress should use its
ability to conduct the necessary analysis of the societal implications of
proposed changes to the copyright regime before increasing (or
decreasing) the property rights of copyright claimants. The Orphan

113. We recognize that orphan works are not always "discarded" in the sense of an
antique in a trash bin. However, if a potential user cannot-despite reasonable diligencefind the copyright owner, it is possible that the copyright owner no longer considers the
work as something in productive use. The concept of abandonment and renewable
copyright terms is one that the Copyright Office should have at least given consideration
as part of its Report. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable
Copyright,70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 476 (2003); and LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF

IDEAS 215 (Random House 2001).
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Works Act is an example of the implicit application of the model
presented in this article.

